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Abstract
In this paper, we explore another factor besides trade costs that
can a¤ect rmsexports: strategic interaction between rms in R&D
investment. Three results can be highlighted. First, the volume of
trade is higher in the presence of R&D than in the absence of it, given
that R&D reduces marginal costs. Second, like with reductions in
trade costs, international trade grows with increases in the return on
R&D, since technological progress enhances rms competitiveness.
Third, when rms di¤er in commitment power in R&D, the R&D
leader plays strategically in R&D in order to become more competitive
and to be more active in international markets than the R&D follower.
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1 Introduction
Trade costs are one of the main ingredients in the theoretical and the em-
pirical models of international economics1. For instance, the most inuential
models in international economics developed in the last thirty years rely
heavily on trade costs. This is the case for the newtrade theory (Krug-
man, 1980), the neweconomic geography (Krugman, 1991), the multina-
tional rms (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) and the heterogeneous rms
models (Melitz, 2003). In e¤ect, in these models, trade costs give rise to
the well-known home market e¤ects, agglomeration e¤ects, the proximity-
concentration trade-o¤ and the rm entry-exit productivity dynamics in ex-
port markets, respectively2.
It therefore comes as no surprise that there is a long tradition of empiri-
cal studies that try to estimate the magnitude of trade costs in international
trade (Moneta, 1959; Waters, 1970; Finger and Yeats, 1976; Harrigan, 1993;
Rauch, 1999 and Hummels 1999, 2001). Also, the most inuential empirical
trade model is the gravity equation where trade costs are quintessential (see
Anderson, 1979, Anderson and Wincoop, 2003, 2004, Chaney, 2008, McCal-
lum, 1995, Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, and Ullah and Inaba, 2011).
Furthermore, some stylized facts on international trade are explained based
on trade costs. For example, the exponential increase in the world trade
in the last century (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001) and the border puzzle
(McCallum, 1995, Treer, 1995 and Anderson and Wincoop, 2003)3.
1According to Anderson and Wincoop (2004), trade costs include all costs to deliver
a good to a nal user (other than the marginal cost of production): transportation
costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tari¤s and nontari¤ barriers),
information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of di¤erent
currencies, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail)".
2The home market e¤ect states that, due to trade costs and increasing returns to scale,
countries with higher demand tend to have a disproportionally larger share of industry
(Krugman, 1980), which in turn can trigger the agglomeration of economic activity in
the larger regions as trade costs decrease (Krugman, 1991). The proximity-concentration
trade-o¤ (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) refers to the trade-o¤ between concentration of
production to explore economies of scale (domestic strategy) and proximity to consumers
to avoid trade costs (multinational strategy). The rm entry-exit productivity dynamics
in export markets (Melitz, 2003) says that a reduction in trade costs can promote the
entry of the more productive domestic rms in the export markets.
3The border puzzlerefers to the empirical evidence that equally distant regions, trade
much more with each other, even after correcting for trade barriers, if they are located in
the same country than if they are located in di¤erent countries.
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Another "puzzle" has received less attention: why international trade
has continued to increase even after trade costs reductions have attened out
(Hummels, 1999, 2001). In fact, while in most part of the 20th century there
was a clear negative correlation between trade costs and international trade,
the same trend has not been as pronounced in the last thirty years. There
are certainly many factors that can explain the decoupling of international
trade and trade costs, and we discuss some of these reasons in section three.
However, in this paper, we focus on one of the factors that could help to
explain this puzzle: R&D investment and strategic competition in R&D.
Note, then, that in this paper we do not deny the importance of trade
costs in international trade. However, we follow the industrial organization
literature on innovation (see Spence, 1984), by highlighting the role of strate-
gic interactions between rms in R&D investment on international trade. The
basic ideas that we explore are the following. In the rst place, R&D invest-
ment can a¤ect trade patterns, since it increases the productivity of rms.
Second, if this is the case, rms can also play strategically in R&D to a¤ect
rivalsexports and in the end trade ows. In the next section, we present
empirical evidence on these two arguments.
With this purpose, we use a simple and stylized Cournot duopoly model
with three R&D scenarios. In the rst, rms do not invest in R&D (bench-
mark no R&D game). In the second, as in Leahy and Neary (1997), rms
invest in process R&D that reduces marginal costs but increases xed costs
(symmetric commitment power in R&D game). The main di¤erence of this
game relatively to Leahy and Neary (1997) is that we do not consider export
and R&D subsidies, and just focus on trade ows. In the third, following
Garcia Pires (2009), we extend the previous case to allow rms to di¤er in
their capacity to commit to the R&D decisions, i.e.: one rm moves in R&D
before the rival (asymmetric commitment power in R&D game). Accord-
ingly, the rst game is used as a benchmark to compare with the second and
third games. With these three games we derive two main results.
First, we show that trade is always higher in the presence of R&D (sym-
metric and asymmetric commitment power in R&D games) than in the ab-
sence of R&D (benchmark no R&D game), given that R&D reduces marginal
costs. Additionally, higher e¢ ciency of R&D, a metaphor for technological
progress, promotes international trade, since the return on R&D activities
(in the form of cost reductions) and, therefore also exports, increases with
the e¢ ciency of R&D. In this way, R&D investment can have similar e¤ects
to a reduction in trade costs in standard trade models.
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The second set of results relates to the asymmetric commitment power in
R&D game. We show that di¤erences between rms in commitment power in
R&D are a door opener for the R&D leader to a¤ect international trade pat-
terns by acting strategically against the R&D follower. To be more precise,
the R&D leader over-invests in R&D in order to achieve higher competitive-
ness than the R&D follower. As a consequence, the former ends up exporting
more than the latter or even being the only rm active in international mar-
kets. This result, that the more e¢ cient rms tend to export more than the
less e¢ cient rivals, is in e¤ect one of the most prominent stylized facts of
international trade unveiled in recent years (see Bernard et al., 2003).
In this way, although asymmetries in commitment power in R&D give the
R&D leader a rst-mover advantage in the spirit of von Stackelberg (1934),
the consequences are more pervasive than the standard output leader advan-
tages. This is so because di¤erences in commitment power in R&D can also
endogenize competitiveness asymmetries in marginal costs between rms. In
a standard Stackelberg model this is not possible, since independently of be-
ing an output leader or an output follower, rms are always symmetric in
marginal costs and therefore in competitiveness.
In sections two and three, we present and discuss the available empirical
evidence and the related literature on R&D and trade, respectively. In section
four, we introduce the base model and dene commitment power in R&D.
In section ve, we derive the production equilibrium. In section six, we
study rmsaccess to international markets. In section seven, we look at the
e¤ects of technology on R&D. In section eight, we analyze how R&D a¤ects
international trade. In section nine, we discuss the robustness of the main
assumptions in the paper. We conclude by discussing our results.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this paper we have two results. First, R&D investment can conduce to the
same e¤ects as reductions in trade costs, given that R&D can reduce marginal
costs of production. Second, strategic competition in R&D can a¤ect trade
ows, since rms invest in R&D in order to a¤ect rivalsstrategic choices on
R&D and therefore production and exports. It is important then to analyze
the empirical evidence on these arguments and the related literature on R&D
and trade. In this section, we report on the empirical evidence and turn to
the related literature in the next section.
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Unfortunately, in what concerns the second result (i.e.: that strategic
investment in R&D a¤ects trade ows), we have not been able to nd any
papers that study this issue directly. In our view, this is surprising since,
as shown by Tybout (2003), strategic interactions are especially crucial in
export markets, due to the fact that international competition is extremely
erce and among a small number of very powerful oligopolist rms. We
therefore believe that there is room for future empirical work in this area.
In any case, there is evidence that the e¤ects of commitment power in
R&D on rmsinnovation e¤orts correspond to the predictions in our model.
For instance, Blundell et al. (1999) show a positive relationship between
market power (a proxy for leadership) and innovation. This result holds in
a panel with many sectors, but is stronger in high-technology sectors. Czar-
nitzki et al. (2008), in a sample of German manufacturing rms, study R&D
intensity at the rm level. They nd that R&D leaders invest more in R&D
than other rms. In turn, Adams and Clemmons (2008) look at the inno-
vation behavior of science based rms. They witness the persistence of rm
leadership in their sample, due in particular to higher innovative activity.
We can then also expect that R&D leadership has a positive impact on ex-
port behavior, since the empirical evidence shows that the more successful
exporters have higher productivity and invest more in R&D than less suc-
cessful exporters and domestic rms (Bernard et al., 2003). In other words,
the more successful exporters can be considered R&D leaders and the less
successful exporters and domestic rms, R&D followers.
In what concerns our rst result (i.e.: that R&D investment can promote
international trade), start by looking at the aggregate data on R&D and
trade. We focus on the OECD area, since R&D data are not easily available
for other regions of the world. In gure 1, we show the evolution of exports
and R&D investment in the OECD from 1988 to 2009 (the data in gure
1 are in logarithms)4. We can see that since the late 1980s, exports in the
OECD have increased at the same pace as R&D investment. This occurred,
as mentioned in the introduction, at the same time as the slowdown in the
decline of trade costs became more pronounced. Figure 2 shows the corre-
lation between exports and R&D investment in the OECD. As anticipated
from gure 1, we nd a very strong correlation between R&D and exports in
the OECD (see gure 2). This is a very simple exercise, since it says nothing
about causation. However, it is at any rate illustrative of the centrality of
4All data from http://www.oecd.org/statistics/.
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Figure 1: R&D and Exports in the OECD
R&D for international trade.
There are, however, some studies at both the macro and the micro level
that indicate that the causation runs from R&D investment to trade. We
start with the macro data studies. Most of these studies also focus on the
OECD area, again due to data availability problems. Gustavsson et al.
(1999) show that international competitiveness and trade ows are deter-
mined by investment in R&D at both the rm and the domestic industry
level. Braunerhjelm and Thulin (2008), point out that an increase in R&D
expenditures of one percentage point implies a three percentage point in-
crease in high-technology exports. Montobbio (2003) conrms the impor-
tance of technological variables for the world market shares of individual
countries. Sanyal (2004) presents evidence that innovation intensity has a
positive and signicant impact on bilateral trade performance. Furthermore,
at the sectoral level, innovation intensity a¤ects bilateral trade performance
positively mainly in the high-technology sectors. In turn, Sterlacchini and
Venturini (2011) show that the long run elasticity of total factor productivity
with respect to the stock of R&D capital varies greatly across countries. Ac-
cording to them, this helps to partially explain the di¤erence in performance
of manufacturing industries across countries.
In turn, Gustavsson et al. (1999), Mancusi (2008) and Laursena and
Meliciani (2012) conrm the centrality of knowledge spillovers and absorp-
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Figure 2: Correlation between R&D and Exports in the OECD
tive capacity for international trade. Gustavsson et al. (1999) highlights the
fact that the investment in embodied technical progress has stronger impact
in medium and high technology industries. Mancusi (2008) demonstrates
that knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacity are particularly e¤ective
for the innovative productivity of technologically laggard countries. Laursena
and Meliciani (2012) nd that international knowledge ows have a positive
and signicant impact on export market shares in information and commu-
nication technologies industries. They also show that small open economies
benet more than other countries from international knowledge ows.
At the micro level, we also have evidence that conrms that R&D invest-
ment has a positive causal impact on the export performance of rms. Aw et
al. (2011) use a micro panel data of rms in the Taiwanese electronics indus-
try. They nd a signicant interaction e¤ect between exporting and R&D
investments and future productivity, after controlling for size, age and cur-
rent productivity. Ganotakis and Love (2011), in turn focus on a sample of
new technology based rms in the UK. They show that innovators are more
likely to export, although on entering export markets successful innovation
does not increase subsequent export intensity. The study of Caldera (2010)
7
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is based on a panel of Spanish rms. She presents evidence of a positive
e¤ect of rm innovation on the probability of participation in export mar-
kets. Lachenmaier and Wömannt (2006), in turn, use German micro data.
They nd that innovation leads to an increase of roughly seven percent in the
export share of German manufacturing rms, with the e¤ect being stronger
in technology-intensive sectors.
3 Related Literature
We now turn to the related literature on R&D and trade. The relationship
between R&D and trade has mainly been analyzed in three strands of the
trade literature: the strategic trade literature (Spencer and Brander, 1983),
the trade and growth literature (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) and the
heterogeneous rms literature (Melitz, 2003).
The strategic trade literature looks at the e¤ects of government subsidies
on the exports of rms. Most of this literature focuses on export subsidies,
but Leahy and Neary (1997) also analyze the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. Leahy
and Neary (1997) show that the strategic behavior of rms in R&D justies
R&D subsidies, especially when R&D spillovers are high, since R&D cooper-
ation is reduced. In Leahy and Neary (1997) all rms have the same level of
commitment power in R&D, in particular if they choose R&D levels before
setting production levels, i.e.: both rms play strategically in R&D. In this
way, the model of Leahy and Neary (1997) is similar to our symmetric com-
mitment power in R&D game, with the exception that we do not consider
R&D subsidies. However, it di¤ers from our asymmetric commitment power
in R&D game where rms di¤er in the level of commitment power in R&D.
In this sense, the paper of Leahy and Neary (1997) has a di¤erent focus from
ours: they look at R&D subsidies when rms are symmetric in commitment
power in R&D, while we focus on trade ows and on the e¤ects of having
rms with asymmetric commitment power in R&D.
In turn, the trade-growth literature studies the channels through which
innovation a¤ects growth and trade (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Firms
in the industrial sector operate under monopolistic competition and they
buy innovations from a perfectly competitive innovative sector. In this way,
innovations are an intermediate product for the industrial sector. Further-
more, the innovative sector performs product R&D investment. The higher
the rate of inventions in the innovative sector, the higher the rate of growth
8
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of the economy. Trade integration can accelerate the rate of growth of the
world economy, since duplication of innovations is eliminated and the mar-
ket for innovations becomes larger. In addition, if R&D spillovers are global
(instead of local), rms in poor countries can benet from innovations in rich
countries. Our paper di¤ers from this literature in that we look at process
R&D instead of product R&D, we consider strategic interactions between
rms and we do not focus on economic growth but on trade ows.
The heterogeneous rms literature analyzes the e¤ects on international
trade of productivity di¤erences across rms. The standard model of this
literature is Melitz (2003), which generates rm heterogeneity randomly by
allocating productivity levels to rms according to some ex-ante statistical
distribution. In this way, productivity di¤erences between rms are exoge-
nous. The main result in this literature is that only the more productive
rms enter the foreign markets, because only these rms can pay the xed
costs of exporting. The literature on heterogeneous rms and R&D usually
starts from this set-up and then look at the e¤ects of trade liberalization
(i.e.: reduction in trade costs) on innovation and trade.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010), for instance, show that a reduction in trade
costs raises the process innovation investment of the exporting rms rela-
tively to that of the non-exporting rms. In this way, trade liberalization
amplies the productivity advantages of the exporting rms relatively to
the non-exporting rms, given that the former at the outset are more pro-
ductive than the latter. Schröder and Sørensen (2012) analyze the e¤ects
of exogenous technological progress in the dynamics of entry and exit of
rms. They show that higher productivity rms survive longer, most rm
closures are young rms, higher productivity exporters are more likely to
continue to export compared to less productive exporters, and market ex-
its as well as rm closures are typically preceded by periods of contracting
market shares. Costantini and Melitz (2008), in turn, analyze rm-level ad-
justments to trade liberalization when rms invest in R&D. In their model,
R&D investment is subject to sunk costs, and innovation involves a trade-o¤
between the costs and the returns of R&D. They show that rms decisions
are determined by non-technological factors such as the timing of trade liber-
alization announcements (anticipated versus non-anticipated) and the speed
of liberalization (gradual versus sudden). In particular, rms innovate in
anticipation of announcements of trade liberation.
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) introduce economic growth à la Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) in the Melitz (2003) model. They show that freer
9
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trade raises productivity, since similarly to Atkeson and Burstein (2010), the
more e¢ cient rms invest more (static e¤ect). However, it slows economic
growth (dynamic e¤ect), since the less e¢ cient rms become even more lag-
gard on productivity. Besides looking at the e¤ects of trade liberalization on
trade and growth in a heterogeneous rms framework, Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2007) raise another issue that is central to this paper. Here, we focus
on an R&D trade-o¤ between marginal and xed costs of production: when
a rm increases the investment in R&D, it can reap lower marginal costs at
the expense of higher xed costs. As we have discussed in the introduction,
there are however other channels that can a¤ect trade ows, and Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud (2007) point out one: reductions on xed costs through
technological progress, instead of marginal cost as in our paper. In fact, they
demonstrate that reductions in xed costs can also be a driver of world trade.
Similarly, if rms di¤er in xed costs (in contrast to marginal costs), they
will also end up with di¤erent levels of market access.
There are then di¤erent ways from the one proposed in this paper to
reconcile the evidence on the "puzzle" of the attening of trade costs and
the continuing increase in trade ows. From the evidence presented in section
two, however, we believe that the mechanism presented in this paper is valid.
However, we do not claim that this is the only channel at work. Future
empirical work on these di¤erent channels could certainly be very helpful by
elucidating us on the relative importance of each one of them.
In any case, in the heterogeneous rms literature, productivity di¤er-
ences between rms are invariably exogenous, since rmscompetitiveness,
and therefore market access, depends only on exogenous factors such as trade
costs and the xed costs of entry in foreign markets. An exception is Edering-
ton and McCalman (2009). They generate endogenous heterogeneity across
rms as a result of rmschoice of technology. In particular, Ederington and
McCalman (2009) analyze how reductions in trade costs a¤ect rmsincen-
tives to choose between di¤erent cost-reducing technologies. They nd that
trade liberalization reduces the likelihood of an industrial shakeout, because
rms adopt more e¢ cient cost structures.
Similarly to Ederington and McCalman (2009), we also endogenize com-
petitiveness asymmetries between rms, but via a di¤erent channel, i.e.: dif-
ferences in commitment power in R&D. In fact, in the asymmetric commit-
ment power in R&D game, productivity asymmetries between rms are pro-
duced endogenously as a result of the strategic responses in R&D of the R&D
leader and the R&D follower. We then argue that strategic interactions be-
10
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tween rms can also contribute to the discussion in the trade literature about
productivity di¤erences across rms and countries.
The introduction of strategic interactions between rms is the main con-
tribution of this paper. As already mentioned, the heterogeneous rms lit-
erature disregards strategic interaction between rms, since it adopts the
monopolistic competition framework. However, as is well known from the
industrial organization literature, strategic interactions are at the core of
productivity di¤erences across rms (see Cabral and Mata, 2003). Further-
more, as we have pointed out in the previous section, strategic interactions
seem also to be particularly important in international trade (Tybout, 2003).
In fact, as shown by the heterogeneous rm literature, only an extremely
small share of rms with very high market power are active in export mar-
kets (Bernard et al., 2003). This means that competition in export markets
is of the oligopoly type, i.e.: with very few and very powerful actors. Our
model, with a duopoly Cournot model and strategic interactions between
rms, seems t to analyze this issue.
4 Model
The world economy consists of two symmetric countries, home and foreign,
and two rms, the home rm and the foreign rm (foreign variables are
indicated by an asterisk). In this sense, our model is not a full-edged general
equilibrium trade model. The simplicity, however, allows us to introduce
strategic competition in R&D. In our view, this ingredient is interesting,
because it is usually absent from trade models. This is due to the fact that
the majority of trade models assume monopolistic competition. For a review
of trade models with oligopolistic competition see Neary (2010).
The home rm and the foreign rm produce a homogenous good to sell
in the domestic market and to export. In the sequel, since the model is
symmetric, we concentrate our attention on the home country and on the
home rm. Equations for the foreign country and for the foreign rm apply
by symmetry. The home rm and the foreign rm face the following indirect
demand in the home country:
P = a  b (q + x) , (1)
where q is the domestic sales of the home rm and x is the exports of the
foreign rm to the home country (similar interpretation holds for q and x).
11
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Likewise, a > 0 and b > 0 stand for the intercept of demand and an inverse
measure of market size, respectively.
Prots by the home rm can be written as:
 = (P   C) q + (P    C   t)x   , (2)
where t > 0 is an indicator of all barriers to trade. In turn, C and   are the
home rms marginal and xed costs, respectively. Similar to what is common
in international trade models, we assume that t = t. This means that the
home rm and the foreign rm have the same level of exogenous access to
international markets. In reality, however, trade costs can be endogenous
to rmsdecisions. A rm can for instance invest in distribution channels.
However, we follow the trade literature by assuming that trade costs are
exogenous (see Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).
From equation 2 we can see the e¤ects of a reduction in trade costs (t).
We have that trade liberalization increases the marginal revenue from exports
and therefore promotes international trade5. In the same way, we can also
note that a reduction in trade costs is equivalent to a reduction in marginal
costs (C). The e¤ects of a reduction in t and C will be seen more clearly
when we derive the expressions for exports (x and x).
In our model, however, rmsaccess to export markets does not depend
only on the exogenous factor trade costs; it also depends on endogenous
factors, in particular R&D investment. Specically, as in Leahy and Neary
(1997), we introduce process R&D investment that reduces marginal costs
(C) but increases xed costs ( ). For the home rm this amounts to:
C = (c  k)
  =  k
2
2
+ f , (3)
where k is R&D investment by the home rm,  > 0 is the cost-reducing
e¤ect of R&D,  > 0 is the cost of R&D and c > 0 and f > 0 are the initial
marginal and xed costs of production (i.e.: without R&D), respectively. We
implicitly assume that the xed costs, f , are su¢ ciently high to not promote
entry, but su¢ ciently low to not make the two rms exit the market.
5In an international context, trade costs can also a¤ect collusive behavior (Andree,
2012) and industry concentration (Jørgensen and Schröder, 2003). We abstract from
these issues in this paper.
12
SNF Working Paper No 38/13
In line with what is standard in the trade literature, we assume that the
foreign rm has a similar cost structure with c = c, f = f ,  =  and
 = . In our case, this assumption is important because it allows us to
show that the competitiveness asymmetries between rms are generated in
our model endogenously.
4.1 Three R&D Games
In this paper, we investigate how R&D and di¤erences in commitment power
in R&D a¤ect international trade. We then compare three games that di¤er
in the nature of R&D competition. In the rst game, rms cannot invest in
R&D (i.e.: k = k = 0). This game is used as the benchmark. In the second
game, the home rm and the foreign rm invest in R&D with symmetric
commitment power in R&D. In the third game, the home rm and the foreign
rm also invest in R&D, but now the two rms have asymmetric commitment
power in R&D (as in Garcia Pires, 2009). In particular, in the third game,
and without loss of generality, we assume that the home rm has a rst-
mover advantage in R&D. As defended by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in
order to justify the rst-mover advantage, we can think of the home rm as
an incumbent that moves in R&D before the entrant foreign rm. However,
since the focus of this paper is not on rmsentry decisions, we abstract from
this issue here. See Spence (1977) for incumbent-entrant models.
According to Bagwell (1995), a rm has commitment power in R&D when
the R&D decisions have commitment value for the output stage, i.e.: R&D
levels are chosen at a previous stage to output. When a rm has no com-
mitment power the rm sets outputs and R&D levels simultaneously. Thus,
when a rm has commitment power, it can use R&D with two objectives: to
improve its own productive e¢ ciency and also to a¤ect the rivals strategic
decisions. When a rm does not have commitment power in R&D, only the
former holds.
In the rest of the paper, variables referring to each of these three games
are identied by the following subscripts, respectively: B for the benchmark
no R&D game, S for the symmetric commitment power in R&D game and
A for the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game.
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4.2 Timing of the Three Games
The benchmark no R&D game is a one shot game in outputs (qB, xB, qB, x

B).
The symmetric commitment power in R&D game has two stages. At the rst
stage, the home rm and the foreign rm decide on R&D investment (kS, kS).
At the second stage they choose outputs (qS, xS, qS, x

S). The asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game also has two stages. However, now at the
rst stage only the home rm moves in R&D (kA). At the second stage,
the foreign rm decides simultaneously on R&D levels (kA) and outputs (q

A,
xA), while the home rm moves on outputs (qA, xA).
Note that the strategic R&D literature (Spence, 1984, Fudenberg and Ti-
role, 1984, Leahy and Neary, 1997) usually assumes that rms have symmet-
ric commitment power in R&D. We di¤er from this literature, by considering
a game where rms have asymmetric commitment power in R&D.
In this sense, the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game is a type
of Stackelberg (1934) leader game, since the home rm has a rst-mover
advantage in R&D. However, as will be seen below, the asymmetric com-
mitment power in R&D game di¤ers in one important aspect from standard
Stackelberg output leader models. In particular, the R&D leader advantages,
unlike the output leader advantages, allow us to endogenize competitiveness
asymmetries between rms in marginal and xed costs.
We are now ready to dene the production equilibrium of the three games.
5 Production Equilibrium
As usual the model is solved by backward induction. From the rst order
conditions (FOCs) for outputs, we obtain6:
q = D+t+2k k

3b
x = D 2t+2k k

3b
q = D+t+2k
 k
3b
x = D 2t+2k
 k
3b
. (4)
6It can be easily checked that for all games in the paper (benchmark no R&D game,
symmetric commitment power in R&D game and asymmetric commitment power in R&D
game), the second order conditions (SOCs) for outputs are always satised.
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To simplify the notation, we make D = (a  c) > 0, where D represents
the rms initial cost competitiveness, i.e.: without R&D investment. As
is standard in oligopolist trade models, we make D   t > 0, so that rms
are not restricted à priori from the export markets (see Neary, 2010). Note,
however, as we will see below, that this assumption does not guarantee per
se that rms are always able to export.
The important point to make from equation 4 is that a reduction in trade
costs (t) conduces to an increase in the exports of both the home and the
foreign rm (x and x). This is a property that is common to di¤erent types of
imperfect competition trade models with either monopolistic or oligopolistic
competition (see Krugman, 1980 and Brander, 1981, respectively). It is this
observation that makes trade costs central for the empirical literature on
trade costs and trade, in which the gravity model is central (see Anderson
and Wincoop, 2004).
From equation 4, we can also see that, similarly to what occurs with a
reduction in trade costs (t), a reduction in the marginal costs without R&D
(c) also conduces to an increase in the exports of the home and the foreign
rm (x and x). In our model, however, marginal costs (C and C) can be
asymmetric for the home and the foreign rm, if they invest di¤erently on
R&D, i.e.: k 6= k. Remember that C = c   k and C = c   k. In other
words, when C = C due to k = k, then a reduction in marginal costs will
be equivalent to a reduction in trade costs for both the home and the foreign
rm. However, when C 6= C due to k 6= k, reductions in marginal costs will
a¤ect di¤erently the home and the foreign rm. In any case (with C = C
or C 6= C), investment in R&D has the potential to increase exports since
it reduces marginal costs. In this way, our model draws on the attention to
two points. First, a reduction in marginal costs can have similar implications
for international trade as a reduction in trade costs. Second, if rms di¤er
in the level of R&D investment, then they will also have di¤erent marginal
costs, which leads to asymmetric e¤ects on rmsexports.
Having said this, we can note that by making k = k = 0 in equation 4,
we have the output expressions for the benchmark no R&D game:
qB = q

B =
D+t
3b
xB = x

B =
D 2t
3b
. (5)
where qB and xB represent the local sales and the exports, respectively,
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of the home rm in the benchmark case with no R&D (qB and x

B refer to
the same variables but for the foreign rm).
For the symmetric commitment power in R&D game and the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game, however, we have to proceed to the R&D
expressions. The FOCs for R&D, though, depend on a rms commitment
power in R&D. We illustrate this with the home rms FOC for R&D, since
the home rm has commitment power in R&D under all R&D games (the
symmetric commitment power in R&D game and the asymmetric commit-
ment power in R&D game). Accordingly, the home rms FOC for R&D
under the symmetric commitment power in R&D game and the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game can be decomposed into three terms:
di
dki
= @i
@ki
+ @i
@qi
dqi
dki
+ @i
@xi
dxi
dki
with i = S;A. (6)
The rst term on the right hand side of equation 6 is usually labeled
as the non-strategic motive for R&D, while the second and third terms are
typically referred to as the strategic motives for R&D7. Hence, R&D is said
to be strategic if the second and the third terms are non-zero. This happens
when a rm chooses R&D at a previous stage to outputs, i.e.: a rm has
commitment power in R&D. Conversely, R&D is said to be non-strategic if
the second and third terms are zero. This occurs when a rm chooses R&D
and outputs simultaneously, i.e.: a rm has no commitment power in R&D.
Summing up, when a rm has commitment power in R&D (i.e.: the home
rm and the foreign rm in the symmetric commitment power in R&D game
and the home rm in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game), it
has a FOC for R&D similar to the one in equation 6. In turn, when a rm
has no commitment power in R&D (i.e.: the foreign rm in the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game), it has a FOC for R&D without the second
and third terms in equation 6. As a result, the home rms R&D expressions
are similar under both the symmetric commitment power in R&D game and
the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, but the same does not
occur for the foreign rm:
ki =
4
3
(qi + xi) with i = S;A, (7)
7The whole FOC for R&D for the home rms is ddk =
@
@k +
@
@q
dq
dk +
@
@x
dx
dk +
@
@q
dq
dk +
@
@x
dx
dk . However, from the FOCs for outputs, we have
@
@q =
@
@x = 0. The SOCs for R&D
are in the appendix.
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kS =
4
3
(qS + x

S) , (8)
kA =


(qA + x

A) , (9)
where kS and kA represent the R&D investment of the home rm in the
symmetric commitment power in R&D game (home and foreign rm move
simultaneously in R&D) and the asymmetric commitment power in R&D
game (the home rm moves before the foreign rm in R&D), respectively.
Similarly, kS and k

A refer to the same variables, but for the foreign rm.
We can now see that in the symmetric commitment power in R&D game,
the home rm and the foreign rm have symmetric incentives to invest in
R&D, since they have symmetric commitment power in R&D (see equations
7 and 8). On the contrary, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D
game, the home rm and the foreign rm have asymmetric incentives to invest
in R&D once they have asymmetric commitment power in R&D (see equa-
tions 7 and 9). In particular, the home rm (the R&D leader) over-invests
in R&D relatively to the foreign rm (the R&D follower) by a proportion of
4
3
, in order to inuence the rivals strategic choices (outputs and R&D).
Note that this di¤ers from standard duopoly R&Dmodels (like Leahy and
Neary, 1997), where duopolists invest symmetrically since they have symmet-
ric commitment power in R&D. Furthermore, over-investment in R&D is in-
dependent of di¤erences in commitment power in R&D, i.e.: over-investment
in R&D also occurs if the rival has commitment power in R&D (as in the sym-
metric commitment power in R&D game). In other words, over-investment
in R&D is the result of Cournot behavior and of a rm choosing R&D before
outputs, not of a rm moving in R&D before the rival.
With the output expressions (equation 4) and the R&D expressions (equa-
tions 7 to 9), we can nd the production equilibrium of the R&D games
(symmetric commitment power in R&D game and asymmetric commitment
power in R&D game). For the symmetric commitment power in R&D game,
we have to solve equations 4, 7 and 8 simultaneously:
qS = q

S =
3D+t(3 4)
b(9 8)
xS = x

S =
3D 2t(3 2)
b(9 8)
kS = k

S =
4(2D t)
b(9 8) , (10)
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where qS and xS represent the local sales and the exports of the home rm
in the symmetric commitment power in R&D game (home and foreign rm
move simultaneously in R&D). Again qS and x

S refer to the same variables,
but for the foreign rm. Also, like in Leahy and Neary (1997), we have that:
 = 
2
b
(11)
where  represents the relativereturn on R&D. A high  stands for a
large return on innovative activities, since the cost-reducing e¤ect of R&D
() weighted by market size (1=b) is large relatively to the cost of R&D ().
The reverse holds for low . In this sense,  can be interpreted as a metaphor
for technological progress.
For the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, we need to solve
equations 4, 7 and 9 simultaneously:
qA =
3D(1 2)+t((3 11)+82)
b(9 4(7 4))
xA =
3D(1 2) t((6 17)+82)
b(9 4(7 4))
qA =
D(3 8)+t((3 10)+82)
b(9 4(7 4))
xA =
D(3 8) t(2(3 9)+82)
b(9 4(7 4))
kA =
4(2D t)(1 2)
b(9 4(7 4))
kA =
(2D t)(3 8)
b(9 4(7 4)) , (12)
where qA and xA represent the local sales and the exports, respectively,
of the home rm in the symmetric commitment power in R&D game (the
home rm moves before the foreign rm in R&D). Again qA and x

A refer to
the same variables, but for the foreign rm.
When the home rm and the foreign rm are symmetric in commitment
power in R&D (the symmetric commitment power in R&D game), then, they
also end up being symmetric in every other respect (equation 10), given that
strategic over-investment in R&D by one rm is o¤set by similar behavior by
the rival. As such, strategic investment in R&D per se does not make rms
asymmetric. In this way, the symmetric commitment power in R&D game
does not di¤er from the benchmark no R&D game, since rms in the two
games are symmetric (equations 5 and 10). However, when the home rm
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and the foreign rm are asymmetric in commitment power (the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game), they become endogenously asymmetric
(equation 12), once the home rm can impose the R&D leader advantage on
the foreign rm (the R&D follower). In the next sections, we analyze the
consequences of this endogenous asymmetry in international trade.
6 FirmsAccess to International Markets
In this section, we study rmsaccess to international markets under the
benchmark no R&D game, the symmetric commitment power in R&D game
and the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game. The parameter of
interest is trade costs (t). In order to do this, we rst investigate how the
autarchy threshold level of trade costs for the home rm and the foreign rm
(t^ and t^, respectively) di¤ers between the di¤erent games; and second how
exports and R&D are a¤ected by changes in trade costs.
We start by analyzing the trade conditions (i.e.: the autarchy threshold
level of trade costs). To compute t^ and t^ we need to solve the export
expressions (equations 5, 10 and 12) for trade costs (t). Using equation 5,
we obtain for the benchmark no R&D game:
t^B = t^

B <
D
2
. (13)
For the symmetric commitment power in R&D game, from equation 10:
t^S = t^

S <
3D
2(3 2) . (14)
For the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, from equation 12:
t^A <
3D(1 2)
6 (17 8)
t^A <
1
2
D(3 8)
3 (9 4) . (15)
Since in the benchmark no R&D game and in the symmetric commit-
ment power in R&D game, the home rm and the foreign rm are always
symmetric (equations 5 and 10), they also have the same level of access to
international markets (equations 13 and 14). On the contrary, given that the
asymmetric commitment power in R&D game the home rm and the foreign
rm become endogenously asymmetric in competitiveness due to di¤erences
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in commitment power in R&D (equation 12), they also end up with di¤erent
levels of access to international markets (equation 15).
As shown in appendix, in order for the trade conditions to be satised we
need that:
0 < t < D
2
. (16)
And also:
0 <  < 3
8
. (17)
First note that equation 17 is more restrictive than the SOC for R&D
(i.e.: 0 <  < 9
16
, see appendix). Second, equations 17 and 16 guarantee
that domestic sales (qi and qi , with i = B; S;A) are always positive, ruling
out monopoly cases. Furthermore, equation 16 ensures that we always have
two-way trade in the benchmark no R&D game and in the symmetric com-
mitment power in R&D game and at least one-way trade in the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game. To see this, note that as  ! 0, t^S ! D2
and as  ! 3
8
, t^S ! 2D3 , i.e.: D2 < t^S < 2D3 . In turn, for the asymmetric
commitment power in R&D game we have that  ! 0, t^A ! D2 and also
t^A ! D2 ; however, when  ! 38 , t^A ! D but t^A ! 0, i.e.: D2 < t^A < D and
0 < t^A <
D
2
.
As such, when the relative return on R&D () is relatively high the foreign
rm can nd it di¢ cult to export, since t > 0 and the threshold level of trade
costs that allows the foreign rm to export tends to zero. In other words,
for high , t^A ! 0 and therefore it is more likely that t > t^A, reducing the
protability of the exports of the foreign rm. In fact, as  ! 3
8
, the foreign
rm might not nd it protable to export. As will be seen in the next section,
this occurs because when the relative return on R&D is high, the R&D leader
can more easily exercise the rst-mover advantage over the R&D follower.
In any case, then, similar to Melitz (2003), our model can also di¤erentiate
between exporters and purely domestic rms.
It is important to remark that it is not necessarily a drawback that in the
asymmetric commitment power in R&D game under certain circumstances
the foreign rm will not be able to export. With this property, and contrary
to standard trade models (like Krugman, 1980 or Brander, 1981), we do not
need to assume that rms in di¤erent countries face di¤erent trade costs in
order to have rms with asymmetric levels of access to export markets. Ac-
cordingly, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, even rms
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that face the same trade costs, can have di¤erent international market access.
Also contrary to Melitz (2003), we do not need to assume that rms have
à priori di¤erent productivity levels, in order for only the more productive
rms to export. In our model, this occurs endogenously as a result of strate-
gic investment in R&D. Here, then, rmsaccess to international markets
depends not only on trade costs, but also on R&D competition.
We can now study the relations between exports, R&D and trade costs.
The following hold as long as equations 17 and 16 are satised:
dxB
dt
=
dxB
dt
=   2
3b
< 0
dxS
dt
=
dxS
dt
=  2(3 2)
b(9 8) < 0
dkS
dt
=
dkS
dt
=   4
b(9 8) < 0
dxA
dt
=   (6 17)+82
b(9 4(7 4)) < 0
dxA
dt
=   2(3 9)+82
b(9 4(7 4)) < 0
dkA
dt
=   4(1 2)
b(9 4(7 4)) < 0
dkA
dt
=   (3 8)
b(9 4(7 4)) < 0. (18)
Not surprisingly, under all games (benchmark no R&D, symmetric com-
mitment power in R&D and asymmetric commitment power in R&D), ex-
ports are reduced when trade costs increase. As we discussed in the intro-
duction, this e¤ect has been one of the main focuses in the trade literature.
Interestingly, however, a reduction in trade costs increases R&D expendi-
tures. What this means is that R&D investment, since it reduces marginal
costs, can magnify the e¤ects of a reduction in trade costs on international
trade. We should see in the next section that this is an important mechanism
in our model.
Next, we would like to know under which game trade is easier for rms.
We therefore analyze the relationship between the di¤erent autarchy thresh-
old levels of trade costs, t^B, t^S, t^A and t^A. We have:
t^A   t^S = 3D2(6 (17 8))(3 2) > 0
t^S   t^B = D3 2 > 0
t^B   t^A =   D(1 4)2(3 (9 4)) 7 0. (19)
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It can be easily seen that t^B > t^A if  >
1
4
; and the reverse for  < 1
4
. Two
cases then arise that depend on the return on R&D (): t^A > t^S > t^B > t^A
for  > 1
4
and t^A > t^S > t^A > t^B for  <
1
4
. If the return on R&D is
relatively high ( > 1
4
), trade is more easy for the R&D leader (the home
rm in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game), and more di¢ cult
for the R&D follower (the foreign rm in the asymmetric commitment power
in R&D game). In the second and third places in the market access ranking
come respectively the rms with symmetric commitment power in R&D (the
home rm and the foreign rm in the symmetric commitment power in R&D
game) and the rms that do not invest in R&D (the home rm and the
foreign rm in the benchmark no R&D game). In turn, if the return on
R&D is relatively low ( < 1
4
), the third and fourth positions in the market
access ranking change. The rm with low commitment power (the foreign
rm in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game) starts to have
better market access than the rms that do not invest in R&D (the home
rm and the foreign rm in the benchmark no R&D game). In other words,
and as we will see in the next section, the R&D follower benets from softer
R&D competition (low ), because the R&D leader nds it more di¢ cult to
exercise the rst-mover advantage in R&D.
What this tells us is that endogenous factors, such as strategic competi-
tion in R&D, are central for a rms involvement in international markets. In
particular, through investment in R&D, the R&D leader can a¤ect not only
its own level of access to international markets but also that of competitors.
In the next section, we explore this issue further.
7 Technology and R&D
Before analyzing the e¤ects of R&D on trade, an important intermediate step
is to look at the inuence of the R&D parameters,  and  (i.e.: technology),
on R&D. We start with the symmetric commitment power in R&D game and
then turn to the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game.
In the symmetric commitment power in R&D game, it can be noted
that, as long as equations 16 and 17 hold, the relationship between R&D
investment (kS and kS) and the R&D parameters is:
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dkS
d
=
dkS
d
= 4(2D t)(9+8)
b(9 8)2 > 0
dkS
d
=
dkS
d
=   36(2D t)b
b22(9 8)2 < 0 (20)
We then have that when rms have symmetric commitment power on
R&D, R&D investment increases with the return on R&D () and decreases
with the cost of R&D (). In the symmetric commitment power in R&D
game, therefore, the higher the cost-reducing e¤ect of R&D and the lower
the cost of R&D (i.e.: the higher the relative return on R&D, ), the higher
the investment in R&D. Furthermore, this e¤ect is symmetric for both the
home and the foreign rm.
In turn, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, as long as
equations 17 and 16 hold, the relation between R&D investment (kA and kA)
and the R&D parameters is:
dkA
d
= 4(2D t)(9+2(4(4+1) 13))
b((9 4(7 4)))2 > 0
dkA
d
=  4(2D t)(9 4(9 10))b
b22((9 4(7 4)))2 < 0
dkA
d
= (2D t)(27+4(8+11)(4 3))
b((9 4(7 4)))2 7 0
dkA
d
=   (2D t)(27+16(11 9))b
b22((9 4(7 4)))2 7 0 (21)
When rms are asymmetric in commitment power in R&D, the R&D
parameters a¤ect asymmetrically the R&D levels of the R&D leader (home
rm) and the R&D follower (foreign rm). The R&D leader behaves with
regard to the R&D parameters in the same way as in the symmetric commit-
ment power in R&D game (equation 20), i.e.: R&D conducted by the R&D
leader increases with the return on R&D () and decreases with the cost of
R&D (). However, this might not necessarily hold for the R&D follower.
For the R&D follower, R&D only increases with the return on R&D for low
values of , whereas for high values of , R&D decreases with . Also, for
the R&D follower, R&D only decreases with the costs of R&D for low values
of , whereas for high values of , R&D by the R&D follower increases with
. This means that R&D by the R&D follower has a U-shaped relation with
 and an inverse U-shaped relation with .
The rationale for this result is the following. For high values of the return
on R&D () and for low values of the cost of R&D (), the R&D leader nds
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it easier to exercise the R&D leadership over the R&D follower. The opposite
occurs for low values of  and for high values of . In other words, when the
relative return on R&D ( = 
2
b
) is high (high  and low ), the R&D leader
gains a competitive advantage over the R&D follower, and vice versa when
the relative return on R&D is low.
We can now better understand the result that the R&D follower faces
more di¢ culties exporting when the relative return on R&D is high. When
the relative return on R&D is high, investment in R&D by the R&D leader
increases relatively to the R&D follower. As a result, the R&D leader nds
it easier to enter the export markets, and the opposite is true for the R&D
follower, since the marginal costs advantage of the former increases relatively
to that of the latter. As we will see in the next section, this has important
consequences for international trade patterns.
8 R&D and Trade
In this section, we analyze the impact of R&D on international trade. We
start by studying how the relative return on R&D,  (i.e.: technology) a¤ects
the trade conditions and exports, t^i, t^i , xi and x

i , with i = S;A. For the
symmetric commitment power in R&D game, as long as equations 17 and 16
are satised, we have that:
dt^S
d
=
dt^S
d
= 3D
(3 2)2 > 0
dxS
d
=
dxS
d
= 12(2D t)
b(9 8)2 > 0. (22)
When rms are symmetric in commitment power (symmetric commitment
power in R&D game), then, higher return on R&D (high ) makes trade easier
for both the home rm and the foreign rm (equation 22).
In turn, for the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, as long as
equations 17 and 16 are satised, we have:
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d(t^A)
d
= 3D(5 16(1 ))
(6 (17 8))2 > 0
d(xA)
d
= 3(2D t)(5 16(1 ))
b(9 4(7 4))2 > 0
d(t^A)
d
= D(3 8(3 4))
2(3 (9 4))2 7 0
d(xA)
d
= 2(2D t)(3 (24 32))
b(9 4(7 4))2 7 0. (23)
Note that
d(t^A)
d
and
d(xA)
d
are positive for 0 <  < 3 
p
3
8
but negative
for 3 
p
3
8
<  < 3
8
. Then, when the home rm and the foreign rm are
asymmetric in commitment power in R&D, and contrary to the symmetric
commitment power in R&D game, it is only the R&D leader (the home rm)
that will always benet with increases in . The R&D follower (the foreign
rm) can experience a deterioration of the level of access to international
markets when the return on R&D is relatively high. The rationale for this
result is that, as discussed in the previous section, when the return on R&D
is very high, the home rm can use the rst-mover advantage in R&D more
e¤ectively to force the foreign rm to export less.
To see this more clearly, we analyze the implications of the endogenous
competitiveness asymmetry property of the asymmetric commitment power
in R&D game. In the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, as
mentioned above, rms become endogenously asymmetric due to di¤erences
in commitment power in R&D. In e¤ect, in spite of the fact that the home
rm and the foreign rm are initially symmetric (c = c), they end up pro-
ducing and investing di¤erently in R&D. It is therefore important to know
more about the competitiveness asymmetries between the home rm and the
foreign rm. Note then, that, as long as equations 17 and 16 are satised,
the following relations hold:
kA   kA = (2D t)b(9 4(7 4)) > 0
(qA + xA)  (qA + xA) = 2
2(2D t)
b2(9 4(7 4)) > 0
xA   xA = 
2(2D t)
b2(9 4(7 4)) > 0
xA   qA = 2(D 8t)+9t(3 1)b(9 4(7 4)) > 0
t^A   t^A = D(9 4(7 4))2(6 (17 8))(3 (9 4)) > 0. (24)
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Relatively to the R&D follower, the R&D leader is more e¢ cient (i.e.:
invests more in R&D, kA > kA), is larger in size (i.e.: produces more, qA +
xA > q

A + x

A) and is more active internationally (i.e.: exports more, xA >
xA). In fact, the competitiveness level of the home rm is so high that it
ends up selling more in the foreign country than the foreign rm itself (i.e.:
xA > q

A). Furthermore, since t^A > t^

A, in the interval t^

A < t < t^A, only the
home rm will be able to export. In fact, the relation t^A > t^A can already be
seen from equation 19. Similarly to Melitz (2003), and as we have already
explained above, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, we
can also have a positive self-selection of rms into the export markets (i.e.:
only the more competitive rms export)8.
So far, we have investigated the e¤ects of R&D on trade at the rm level.
However, we are also interested in knowing what happens to trade volumes in
the three games (the benchmark no R&D game, the symmetric commitment
power in R&D game and the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game).
We can show that trade volumes in the three games equal:
XB = xB + x

B =
2(D 2t)
3b
XS = xS + x

S =
2(3D 2t(3 2))
b(9 8)
XA = xA + x

A =
2D(3 7) t(12 (35 16))
b(9 4(7 4)) . (25)
It then follows:
XS  XA = (2D t)(3 8)b(9 4(7 4))(9 8) > 0
XA  XB = (2D t)(7 16)3b(9 4(7 4)) > 0. (26)
Trade volumes are higher when rms have symmetric commitment power
in R&D. In turn, trade volumes are lower when rms do not invest in R&D.
In the middle of the ranking is the scenario where rms have asymmetric
commitment power in R&D. The reason for XS > XA is that, as we have
seen above, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, the R&D
follower has poorer market access than rms in the symmetric commitment
8There are two explanations in the literature of why exporting rms are more productive
than domestic rms: positive self-selection into the export markets (as in Melitz, 2003);
and learning-by-export (see Clerides et. al., 1998).
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power in R&D game (equation 19). In this sense, trade is more encouraged
when rms are symmetric in competitiveness (the symmetric commitment
power in R&D game) than when rms are asymmetric in competitiveness (the
asymmetric commitment power in R&D game). At any rate, the possibility
to invest in R&D increases trade volumes relatively to the case where R&D
investment is not possible.
The role of R&D can be even more far-reaching than just increasing in-
ternational trade relatively to the no-R&D-scenario. In fact, the relationship
between the volume of trade and the return on R&D () is:
dXS
d
= 24(2D t)
b(81 16(9 4)) > 0
dXA
d
= (2D t)(21 16(6 7))
b(81 8(63 2(67 8(7 2)))) > 0. (27)
When R&D is more e¢ cient (i.e.: higher ), like low trade costs, R&D
increases the volume of trade for both the symmetric commitment power in
R&D game and the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game. In e¤ect,
it is no surprise that under the symmetric commitment power in R&D game
the volume of trade increases with the return on R&D, since both xS and xS
also increase with  (equation 22). In the asymmetric commitment power in
R&D game, however, this result is noteworthy, since xA decreases with the
return on R&D when  is high (equation 23). This means that the increase
in exports for the R&D leader compensates for the reduction in exports that
might occur for the R&D follower.
In this way, R&D competition can help to explain two stylized facts about
international trade patterns: the increase in the world trade in the last cen-
tury (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001); and asymmetries in the export behavior
of rms, i.e.: more competitive rms export more (Bernard et al., 2003).
First, the increase in the world trade might have been the result not only
of a secular reduction in trade costs, but also of technological competition
(R&D investment) and technological progress (high ). Accordingly, invest-
ment in R&D and higher e¢ ciency of innovative activities facilitate access to
international markets, because they make exports more protable. Second,
asymmetries in the export behavior of rms can be the outcome of strategic
interactions in R&D. In fact, we have seen that the technological leader can
use R&D strategically with the objective to deter the technological laggard
from the export markets.
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9 Robustness of Results
In this section, we comment on the robustness of the results of our model. In
particular, we discuss the following generalizations: oligopolistic competition
and market entry; Bertrand competition; product R&D, R&D spillovers,
learning-by-doing and patents; heterogeneous rms and the e¤ects of R&D
investment on the extensive and the intensive margin; international mergers;
public policy (R&D and export subsidies) and mixed duopoly markets. These
generalizations are particularly important for the two R&D games in the
paper (symmetric and asymmetric commitment power in R&D games), and
we therefore focus the discussion on these two games.
With oligopolistic competition and symmetric commitment power in R&D
all rms would invest strategically in R&D. As argued by Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1984), as the number of rms increases in the market, strategic invest-
ment becomes less e¤ective, since strategic investment by one rm tends to
be canceled by the rivalsstrategic investment. This means that the second
and third terms in equation 6 would tend to vanish, i.e.: rms would tend to
invest at the social optimum without waste of resources in over-investment.
In any case, even in the extreme case where strategic investment is canceled,
R&D investment would continue to allow rms to reduce marginal costs.
Therefore we should continue to expect higher trade volumes when rms in-
vest in R&D than when rms do not do so. If rms di¤er in commitment
power in R&D, and if there are many rms with commitment power in R&D,
the same canceling e¤ect on strategic investment that we have just discussed
would arise. If however, there are few rms with commitment power in R&D,
these rms would be able to play strategically against the rms with no com-
mitment power in R&D and restrict their output levels. In this way, with
oligopoly (with strategic or no strategic investment in R&D), our results with
a duopoly market structure would not be much changed.
Free entry and exit would lead us to analyze the short and the long run
equilibrium. In the long run, the strategic motive for R&Dwould be canceled,
since prots would tend to zero, which would require that the strategic terms
in equation 6 are also zero (Neary, 2010). However, in the short run the same
e¤ects as in the duopoly case would be at play. At any rate, in the short or
in the long run, R&D would continue to reduce marginal costs. Therefore,
again, there is no reason to believe that free entry and exit would alter the
result that R&D increases trade ows relatively to scenarios with no R&D.
If we take into account price competition, the outcome would depend on
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whether we introduce di¤erentiated products or not. As shown by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984) when rms invest in R&D, products are homogeneous
and rms compete à la Bertrand, rms under-invest in R&D in order to
soften price competition, i.e.: the second and third terms in equation 6 are
negative. In this sense, with Bertrand competition and homogeneous goods
we should expect that the magnication e¤ect of trade via R&D is smaller
with Bertrand competition than with Cournot competition. Note, however,
that in spite of this, trade would still be higher than in a scenario with no
R&D, since R&D would continue to reduce marginal costs. If instead of
homogeneous products we have di¤erentiated products, however, the result
that rms over-invest in R&D is restored, and therefore the main conclusions
from our duopoly-Cournot model would continue to hold.
Product R&D, R&D spillovers, learning-by-doing and patents on inter-
national trade are explored by Grossman and Helpman (1991) in the context
of monopolistic competition models with CES demand (see also Tingvall
and Poldahl, 2011; Espínola-Arredondo and Muñoz-García, 2011 and Llorca
Vivero, 2001). They show that product R&D increases international trade
since consumers across countries like variety, and therefore wish to consume
products invented in other countries. R&D spillovers and learning-by-doing
can augment these e¤ects since they allow producers in di¤erent countries,
especially in more poor countries, to enter the innovation race. Patents have
the traditional two-side inuence on innovation. On the one hand, patents
guarantee future prots and therefore promote innovation, since they protect
rms from imitation by rivals. On the other hand, patents limit the R&D
spillovers to other rms. Note that with oligopolistic competition, as mo-
nopolistic competition models have no strategic interaction between rms,
besides the e¤ects above, we could expect some additional outcomes. For
example, patents could lead to rst-mover advantages of the type we ex-
plore in this paper. Also, R&D spillovers could drive rms to under-invest in
R&D to limit R&D competition, similarly to what happens with Bertrand
competition with homogeneous goods.
The introduction of heterogeneous rms of the Melitz (2003) type would
lead us to consider the inuence of R&D investment on the extensive and
the intensive margin. With heterogeneous rms only the more e¢ cient rms
would be able to access the exports markets. This e¤ect is present in the
asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, where the R&D follower can
be excluded from international trade by the R&D leader due to higher cost
competitiveness of the later. In this way, our model also considers the e¤ects
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of R&D on the intensive margin, given that the more e¢ cient rms (the
R&D leader) export more than the less e¢ cient rms (the R&D follower),
which might not export at all. However, in our set-up with just two rms
and no entry and exit, we cannot look at the e¤ects of R&D investment on
the extensive margin, i.e.: how R&D a¤ects entry and exit of rms. With
more than two rms, entry-exit and heterogeneous rms, R&D could make
the more competitive domestic rms start to export and the less competitive
domestic rms exit the market.
The e¤ects of international mergers would again depend on whether rms
have symmetric or asymmetric commitment power in R&D. If rms have
symmetric commitment power in R&D, a merger would conduce to the well-
known merger paradox. The merging rms would be worse o¤ while the
non-merging rms would be better o¤, since the latter would have fewer
competitors (Salant et al., 1983), i.e.: decreasing the number of rms would
raise industry prots and per rm prot, but the merger rms would obtain
a relatively smaller share of the industry prots. If rms have asymmetric
commitment power in R&D, though, the merger paradox might not hold.
This is so, since when an R&D leader merges with a rival, by reducing the
number of competitors, the merger would increase the rst-mover advantage
in R&D of the merging entity. Therefore, the prots of the merging rms
could increase relatively to the non-merging rms.
R&D and export subsidies in set-ups where rms have symmetric com-
mitment power have been explored in the strategic trade literature (Leahy
and Neary, 1997). However, to our knowledge, this has not been the case
when rms have asymmetric commitment power in R&D. With symmetric
commitment power in R&D, a government has incentives to subsidize local
rms in order to promote them to export more than foreign rivals. However,
if all governments subsidize local rms, no country gains a trade advantage.
If rms di¤er in commitment power, the country where the R&D leader is
located will not have incentives to subsidize the local rm, since the role of a
subsidy is to make the local rm play Stackelberg against foreign rivals, and
the R&D leader already has this advantage. The opposite would be the case
for the R&D follower. The country that hosts the R&D follower could try to
introduce a subsidy to cancel the rst-mover advantage of the R&D leader
in favor of the domestic R&D follower.
In a scenario where private rms compete with public rms (mixed duopoly),
the rst question to ask is whether we should model the public rms with or
without commitment power in R&D. In the literature on mixed oligopolies
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it is usually assumed that public rms operate to maximize welfare (Mat-
sumura, 1998). In the context of our model this would mean that the pub-
lic rms would not invest strategically in R&D. Therefore, we would have
private rms investing strategically in R&D against public rms investing
non-strategically. Contrary to the mixed oligopoly literature, however, the
presence of the public rms would not conduce to "regulation by participa-
tion" for the private rms, since the former would not be able to compel the
latter to not invest strategically in R&D. In this sense, in a mixed duopoly,
we should expect that the results from the asymmetric commitment power
in R&D game are replicated.
10 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed how rmsaccess to international markets is
a¤ected by R&D competition. In order to study this issue, we have compared
three games that di¤er in terms of R&D competition. In the rst game, rms
do not invest in R&D; in the second, rms invest in R&D with symmetric
commitment power in R&D; and in the third, rms invest in R&D with
asymmetric commitment power in R&D. From the comparison of these three
scenarios, we found that, irrespective of commitment power in R&D, trade
volumes are always higher when rms invest in R&D than when they do not.
However, trade volumes are higher when rms have symmetric rather than
asymmetric commitment power in R&D. Furthermore, technological progress
(i.e.: higher e¢ ciency of R&D) increases the volume of trade, similarly to
what occurs with low transport costs in standard trade models.
We have also shown that asymmetries in commitment power in R&D can
be used to endogenize competitiveness asymmetries between rms. In par-
ticular, we have showed that the R&D leader becomes endogenously more
competitive than the R&D follower, since it invests more in R&D, and there-
fore achieves lower marginal costs than the latter. As a consequence, the
R&D leader also has better access to export markets than the R&D follower.
Furthermore, the only rm that might not benet from technological progress
is the R&D follower. The reason for this is that technological progress makes
competition against the R&D follower much ercer, since it makes it easier
for the R&D leader to exercise the rst-mover advantage.
In this way, this paper contributes to the literature on R&D and trade,
which can be divided into three strands: the strategic trade literature (Leahy
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and Neary, 1997); the trade-growth literature (Grossman and Helpman,
1991); and the heterogeneous rms literature (Atkeson and Burstein, 2010).
Relatively to the strategic trade literature, we have changed the focus from
R&D subsidies to R&D competition. Furthermore, we have added the asym-
metric commitment power game in R&D, with an R&D leader and an R&D
follower. To our knowledge, this scenario has not previously been analyzed
in this literature. In what concerns the trade-growth literature, we do not
consider economic growth or product R&D, and focus instead on process
R&D. Also in our model, R&D is performed by the rms themselves and not
by an outside perfect competitive sector. Compared to the heterogeneous
rms literature, asymmetries between rms are generated endogenously as
a result of rmsstrategic choices in R&D, and not exogenously as a result
of an ad-hoc statistical distribution of productivity. In addition, we consider
strategic interactions between rms, which are overlooked in the trade-growth
and heterogeneous rms literature. We then present an alternative channel
to explain how R&D can promote trade and why rms are asymmetric in
competitiveness and in the level of access to international markets: strategic
competition in R&D.
Future research should try to test empirically some of the predictions of
our model. First, it should analyze whether the observed increase in R&D
expenditures in the world economy over the last century has contributed to
the increase in trade ows, and whether this R&D-trade e¤ect continued af-
ter the attening out of trade costs. This exercise requires time series on
trade ows, trade costs and R&D investment across countries and industries.
Second, it should test whether countries and industries that invest more on
R&D, trade more with each other than countries and industries that invest
less on R&D, since we should expect that the former are more competitive
in international markets than the latter. For this analysis it is necessary to
look at a cross-section of data on R&D expenditures and trade ows across
countries and industries. Third, it should study R&D leaders and their be-
havior in international markets relatively to R&D followers. Investigating
this requires rm level data in order to identify R&D leaders and R&D fol-
lowers and how they di¤er in terms of export performance. By answering
these questions, we will gain a better understanding of the interconnections
between trade and R&D competition.
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A Appendix
Second order condition for R&D In the symmetric commitment power
in R&D game, the home rm and the foreign rm have the same SOC for
R&D, in particular: d
2S
d(kS)
2 =
d2S
d(kS)
2 =  (9 16)9 < 0. Then, the SOC for
R&D under the symmetric commitment power in R&D game only holds if
0 <  < 9
16
. In turn, in the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, the
home rm and the foreign rm have di¤erent SOCs for R&D. The SOC for
R&D for the home rm is d
2A
d(kA)
2 =  (9 16)9 < 0, while for the foreign rm
is d
2A
d(kA)
2 =  (3 4)3 < 0. As such, in the asymmetric commitment power in
R&D game, the two SOCs for R&D are only satised if 0 <  < 9
16
. Then
the symmetric and the asymmetric commitment power in R&D games have
the same SOC for R&D.
Trade conditions Standard trade models usually make two restrictions
on the trade conditions (equations 13 to 15 in our model). First, that the
trade conditions are positive (given that t > 0) and second that the level of
t satises the trade conditions (i.e.: that trade is possible).
We start with the restriction that t^B, t^S, t^A and t^A are positive. Since
D > 0, t^B is always positive. However, the same might not be the case for
t^S, t^A and t^A. From the SOC for R&D (0 <  <
9
16
) and equations 13 and
15; t^S, t^A and t^A are always positive if equation 17 in the main text holds.
We turn now to the restriction that trade costs do not forbid trade.
Autarchy scenarios can be easily eliminated from the symmetric games (bench-
mark no R&D game and symmetric commitment power in R&D game). In
fact, as long as t < D
2
, two-way trade is always possible in these two games.
In the asymmetric commitment power in R&D game, however, matters are
not so straightforward. In fact, with t < D
2
, we can only guarantee that the
home rm is always going to be able to export, i.e.: the same might not occur
for the foreign rm, since as  ! 3
8
, t^A ! 0. Then, in the asymmetric com-
mitment power in R&D game with t < D
2
, we can assure that one-way trade
always arises (from home to foreign), but not necessarily two-way trade.
The strategy we follow is to restrict the parameter space to always en-
compass at least one-way trade. This is so as long as equation 16 in the main
text is satised.
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